These stanzas illustrate the frustration of the island's coastwise longshoremen in late June 1920--on strike for a 25 percent wage increase since March 19. Day after day, hundreds of strikebreakers worked an increasing number of ships tied up along the docks of the Morgan Line and Mallory shipping companies. No strangers to conflict, the longshoremen were used to such tactics, but the event that inspired these verses caught them completely off guard.
On June 7, the "modern pigmy Scipio" Gov. William P. Hobby declared martial law and took control of the strike situation in Galveston. Within days, more than one thousand soldiers occupied the island and for the next four months, the striking dockworkers indeed bent their knees to what they believed was tyranny, watching as "pompous Generals" and "Majors bold" trampled upon their rights. By the time the troops left in October, the union stronghold of Galveston bore at least a metaphorical similarity to ancient Carthage-although the city remained physically intact, its entire organized labor movement lay in ruins, especially the longshore unions. Much like their Roman predecessors, business leaders and their allies in Austin hoped to prevent future annoyances from this modern Carthage; rather than salt the earth, however, these men planted and nurtured the antiunion doctrines of the open shop. Ultimately, the Galveston longshoremen's strike was a major turning point in the history of the Texas labor movement. Supported by bayonets and rifles, Texas's business interests joined the nationwide assault on the American working class and launched the capital-state alliance that would prove so disastrous for organized labor through the 1920s.
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When the 1,600 members of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) Locals 385 and 807 walked off their jobs on March 19, 1920, they had no idea that their actions would have such dramatic repercussions. The weeks and months leading up to the strike had demonstrated the longshoremen's continued faith in the wartime bargaining power granted them by the federal government through the National Adjustment Commission (NAC). The origins of the strike lay in two hearings held between ILA representatives, the shipping companies, and the NAC in October and December 1919. Presented with a demand for higher wages, the shipping representatives stubbornly refused, arguing instead that Congress must first The Galveston Longshoremen's Strike of [1920] [1921] allow an increase in freight rates. The newly reorganized peacetime NAC, meanwhile, backed off, stating that the privately owned shipping companies bore full responsibility for resolving the wage dispute, thus effectively eschewing its functions as arbitrator. By March 1920, the longshoremen had had enough of this back-and-forth. Following the lead of locals in New York, the Galveston longshoremen "woke up to the fact that their loyalty to the city and country had caused them to allow their employers to play with them for a period of six months" and voted to go out on strike. 3 As frustrated as they were by their companies' intransigence and the NAC's impotence, the longshoremen nevertheless exercised great restraint in their strike activities, confining themselves primarily to peaceful picketing. Although local papers reported minor incidents, the only violence of any mention took place on May 11, when a police officer accompanying strikebreakers on an interurban rail car bound for Houston received a bullet wound in his shin. 4 The striking unions quickly condemned the incident and denied any responsibility. Further investigation by the Galveston police supported the longshoremen's innocence-Police Chief W. J. Sedgewick blamed the affair on "disturbers."
5 Bolstered by such official support, J. H. Fricke, president of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District of the ILA, would later call the strike "the most peaceful, law-abiding controversy in history." 6 Though Fricke's words may be something of an exaggeration, the strikers' overall passivity was indeed noteworthy, especially when one considers their racial composition: of the 1,600 men on strike, the 900 members of Local 385 were white, while the remaining 700 members of Local 807 were African American. Since 1912, Galveston's longshoremen had maintained a fragile and frequently contested 50-50 agreement in which whites controlled all the jobs on the Southern Pacific docks and blacks monopolized those of the Mallory line. Modeled after similar arrangements in New Orleans, this biracialism was based strictly on pragmatic considerations. 7 Whether they liked it or not, white longshoremen simply could not overlook the large numbers of African 4 See, for example, Galveston Daily News, Apr. 26, 1920. The paper contained details of a small "affray" between two whites, a black, and a Mexican near the Mallory docks on April 25. Although the reporting police officer felt the fight was strike-related, the combatants were not apprehended and this suspicion was never proven. 5 Galveston Daily News, May 12, 1920; Houston Post, May 12, 13, 1920; and Union Review, May 21, 1920.
6 Galveston Daily News, June 4, 1920. 7 James C. Maroney, "The International Longshoremen's Association in the Gulf States during the Progressive Era," Southern Studies, 16 (Summer, 1977), 228-230. My analysis of biracial Americans in their industry. In 1920, blacks made up well over 50 percent of the waterfront workforce in Texas. 8 If either race hoped to improve its position on the docks, it would have to ally with the other. This did not mean, however, that social equality was ever a goal. Both unions were careful to avoid raising this specter, since doing so would have called down upon them the wrath of the entire racist society in which they lived. The strike was no exception to this. Both black and white longshoremen realized, especially after their employers began importing strikebreakers in late April, that if they hoped to bring the strike to a successful conclusion, they would have to maintain at least the semblance of economic cooperation across the color line.
What then was the motive behind Hobby's otherwise unprovoked declaration of martial law? As the few minor incidents above indicate, it would have severely strained the governor's credibility to claim violence as the underlying cause. Hobby also could not truthfully say that the dockworkers sought a new racial order. In any case, if social equality had been one of the strikers' goals, white Galvestonians would likely have taken care of the matter themselves. While the answers to such questions may seem elusive to historians, contemporary observers and participants had no doubt what Hobby's motives were. In the headlines of its June 7 issue, the Houston Press articulated perhaps the most succinct explanation of the governor's actions: "Open Shop War is On." 9 Simply put, Hobby's aim in declaring martial law was the establishment of an open shop in Galveston. His decision to do so followed a nationwide trend that reached its peak in the early 1920s. During the first five years of the decade, strike duty accounted for about 90 percent of all National Guard activity throughout the country.
10 Whether or not Hobby was aware of such events outside Texas is unknown; suffice to say, however, that his actions placed the organized longshoremen of Galveston in the same position as many other union members across the country. It was under the influence of such ideas that Galveston's business interests viewed the longshoremen's struggle. On May 6, the conflict assumed a new level of urgency for these men when Mallory line officials announced that two steamers that had departed from New York had changed course to dock in the rival city of Port Arthur rather than Galveston. Soon thereafter, several ships already in port left to receive their cargo elsewhere. Eight days later, agent F. T. Rennie further complicated the situation when he declared that the Mallory line intended to cease operations in Galveston indefinitely and move its offices and terminals to Port Arthur. J. B. Denison, vice president of the company, stated, "I don't know if the Mallory line will ever return to Galveston, but in case it does, conditions making it possible for vessels to be worked unhampered by strikers must prevail." Morgan officials held their tongues, but on May 17, rumors leaked into the press that they too might relocate their affairs to either New Orleans or Sabine. Perhaps trying to capitalize on this fear, the Southern Pacific's general agent H. M. Wilkins refused to either confirm or deny the reports. 13 The prospect of losing two of Galveston's most important shipping concerns made the island's businessmen eager to end the strike and no doubt did much to enhance the appeal of the open-shop movement in their eyes.
For their part, the state's open-shop crusaders were only too willing to help Galveston's beleaguered business interests. Breaking the power of organized labor in such a strongly unionized town would be a spectacular victory for their movement. Beginning with the formation of the Screwmen's Benevolent Association in 1866 and continuing with the introduction of the ILA in the early 1900s, Galveston's waterfront had been a bastion for unions, who in turn provided their members with a great deal of power in the city's affairs.
14 On May 22, the Southwestern and Square Deal open shop associations announced that they would offer whatever assistance they could in relieving the freight congestion. In pledging their aid, these two groups claimed to have the cooperation of similar organizations in twentyone cities across the state. One week later, F. O. Thompson, the head of the Southwestern Association, arrived in Galveston with the goal of adding another city to this list. In a closed-door meeting with local civic and business leaders, the open-shop leader outlined plans for inaugurating a new movement on the island.
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The Texas Chamber of Commerce was quick to throw its support behind the open shop as well. At a May 29 meeting, the board of directors adopted a resolution opposing strikes, picketing, the minimum wage, boycotts, and governor with a petition asking him "to provide adequate protection to citizens of Texas in the port of Galveston while in the pursuit of their work, even to the extent of declaring martial law." Thanks to the "utterly inadequate" and fully unionized police force, assaults occurred on an almost daily basis against these nonunion American citizens. Repeated petitions to local authorities for protection had yielded no help, causing a congestion of goods the Chamber committee valued between $5 and $7 million. As a result, the inventories of many mercantile establishments in Texas and the Southwest had grown short, and the downward trend in prices seen elsewhere in the United States was not present in Texas. The committee also attempted to appeal to the governor's racial prejudices, reporting that blacks controlled the powerful Dock and Marine Council in the port, a charge that was adamantly denied by the white longshoremen. Hobby, they concluded, had a constitutional duty to exercise his authority and offer state protection so that the operation of the docks could proceed in "a systematic, lawful, comprehensive fashion in the interest of the city, state, and nation." These business leaders were quite fortunate to have a man like William Pettus Hobby in Austin. A native of East Texas, the governor had made a name for himself at the age of twenty-nine as editor of the Beaumont Enterprise. Hobby used the paper to promote civic improvement and commerce in his adopted city, championing everything from a deepwater port to improvement of the surrounding roads. Such actions led his overly admiring biographer to conclude that Hobby believed "Transportation . . . was the key to human progress." In 1914, the young editor made the transition into politics as the state's lieutenant governor. Following Gov. James Ferguson's impeachment in 1917, Hobby became Texas's supreme executive authority on September 25. The election of 1918 returned Hobby easily to office in his own right. A dynamic political leader by Texas's standards, Hobby threw his gubernatorial weight behind such issues as women's suffrage, prohibition, and education reform. He also placed the foundering highway department on its feet, an indication that his biographer's assessment contained some validity.
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Given his penchant for transportation and economic improvement, it was little wonder that Hobby responded to the strike as he did. The governor's reputation for progressivism did not easily extend to striking workers in an industry so intimately connected to his obsession with commerce.
Even more important than his boosterism and political record, however, was Hobby's demonstrated willingness to use force in maintaining law and order throughout his term. The governor's first experience with martial law occurred during the Texas-Louisiana oil field strike that began in November 1917. Although evidence indicated that the strike was proceeding peacefully, Hobby succumbed to reports of radical activity and requested federal troops in the area around Humble. With the army's help, the oil producers crushed the strike in January 1918.
19 Hobby also played the role of commander in chief during the Red River War between Texas and Oklahoma in mid-1919. Hoping to assert the state's claim to oil found in the riverbed, the governor sent Rangers to the North Texas town of Burkburnett. Before leaving office in 1921, Hobby placed nearly the entire state police force along Texas's northern frontier. 20 Like his actions in the Gulf Coast oil fields, Hobby's role in the Red River affair illustrated his propensity for using force when he perceived the state's economic interests to be in danger. His experiences seem to have made him quite susceptible to the propaganda and appeals for military intervention presented by the open-shop Chamber committee and its allied business interests throughout Texas.
Upon hearing the committee's requests, Hobby immediately sprang into action, issuing a telegraphic ultimatum to Mayor H. O. Sappington and Galveston County Sheriff Henry Thomas on June 3. "[The strike] has reached proportions affecting the business interests and material welfare of Texas and the property rights of citizens to such an extent," said Hobby, "that unless police protection is given . . . I shall, under the constitution and the laws of The Galveston Longshoremen's Strike of [1920] [1921] Texas, assume control." Setting the deadline for action on Saturday, June 5, Hobby then ordered Adj. Gen. W. D. Cope of the Texas National Guard to proceed at once to Galveston. His directions were "to take such action as will be necessary to enforce the laws of the state without partiality, and to keep open those arteries of trade which are essential to the prosperity and uninterrupted conduct of business in Texas." Twenty-nine units of the National Guard, including three machine gun companies and four troops of Houston cavalry, assembled in their armories to await instructions from Austin.
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Organized labor responded indignantly to the business committee's widely publicized pilgrimage and Hobby's subsequent actions. At a mass meeting held on June 4, a mixed crowd of 1,500 union members, including between 300 and 400 African Americans, adopted a resolution protesting the governor's intention of sending troops to Galveston and the Chamber committee's misrepresentation of the facts. The Union Review argued that these "union labor haters" misrepresented the Galveston conditions to the governor, citing as an example the committee's assertion that the strike delayed delivery of 15 million bushels of grain. "Any one [sic] who knows anything about the coastwise traffic out of Galveston," argued the journal, "knows that the coastwise ships of the Mallory and Morgan line carry no grain and never have." Responsibility for holdups in the port's grain traffic rested entirely upon the deep sea shipping companies and the rail lines that served them. I. M. Barb, president of the Galveston Labor Council, seconded this, saying that Hobby and the Austin committee overlooked the lack of arrests since the strike began. Barb stated that the actions of the Governor were "wholly uncalled for and entirely unnecessary."
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The citizenry and municipal officials of Galveston generally echoed much of this criticism. Although they refused to be quoted, the Daily News reported that "several prominent business men of the city" expressed their disapproval at the threatened use of troops. Less guarded action emanated from the city commission. On June 3, its members unanimously approved a resolution protesting Hobby's actions. According to the commissioners, the strikers had proven themselves, with few exceptions, as law abiding and peaceful citizens. For this reason, the strikebreakers did not need protection. If problems did arise, the local police force could deal with them itself. The commissioners also called a mass meeting for that evening at the city auditorium. In front of a crowd of 1,500, City Atty. contained in the city's resolution: Galveston would view a declaration of martial law as an insult to its citizenry.
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The city commission's indirect support for the strikers remained a recurrent theme throughout the conflict. Elected in 1919 with the backing of organized labor, the so-called City Party had wrested control of the municipal government from the hands of the Citizen's Party, the representative of Galveston's aristocratic interests. Since its election, this new administration had offered a serious challenge to elite control of Galveston, even going so far as to secure a series of amendments to the city charter in early May 1920 that were hostile to the interests of the island's leading businessmen. These amendments included such progressive provisions as the recall of city officials, eminent domain, and authorization for the city government to purchase and sell up to two-thirds of the powerful, elitecontrolled Galveston Wharf Company's total value. 24 At least one scholar has argued that the City Party's victory in the bitter amendment battle was a direct cause of martial law. 25 Although it is difficult to conclusively draw a straight line between the two events, there is still much in this thesis to recommend it to historians. As subsequent events would demonstrate, such class tensions were fundamental to understanding the events of the strike and the declaration of martial law.
Such political currents notwithstanding, however, not even the city commission's protests prevented Hobby from moving forward. On the morning of June 4, Cope arrived in Galveston accompanied by Maj. Gen. John Hulen and Ranger Capt. Joe Brooks. After meeting with city officials in a closed-door session, Cope and his entourage attended a public hearing presided over by the mayor and commissioners. The hearing, which featured speeches by Fricke and fellow labor activist M. J. Gahagan of Local 385, presented Cope with the facts of the strike, reemphasizing its peaceful nature and the ability of the local police force to handle any situation that might arise. Mayor Sappington admitted denying police protection on two occasions, but justified these refusals with the argument that an armed presence would have only stirred up greater trouble. Commissioner A. P. Norman spared no words, branding the charges against his police force as "damn lies." When Cope finally spoke, he neglected to mention the strike at all. Instead, he stressed that his only reason for visiting Galveston was to see the freight moved. Galvestonians breathed a collective sigh of relief when the June 5 deadline passed without a declaration of martial law. After appearing on the docks that morning and observing the situation, Cope stated, "Freight is moving at the Mallory wharf and switchmen are at work moving empty freight cars and pulling out loaded ones. Additional workers are employed on the docks. The mayor and the chief of police have assured me that the fullest police protection will be given workers on the docks and going to and from their homes." 27 Soon thereafter, the adjutant general received a telegram from Hobby. The governor requested that Cope remain in Galveston and hold in readiness such troops as might be necessary to deal with any further holdups or threats of violence. According to H. H. Haines, this announcement pleased the business community. He believed that the threat of martial law would provide a sufficient guarantee of improvement in the port's operations. With the recruitment of additional labor, normal conditions would return shortly. Haines's words carried a grain of truth. The day after Cope's announcement, reports indicated that approximately eighty nonunion men had shown up on the Mallory docks to move and load freight. The Daily News reported that this was "due solely to the presence of General Cope and a group of rangers" and optimistically estimated that accumulated freight would be cleared within three or four days. 29 Even more telling, on June 2, Southern Pacific agent C. J. Blackwell wrote a letter to Cope in which he claimed that everything was running smoothly on the docks. His company employed about 150 laborers and brought in new hands every day. Blackwell also discussed the local police, saying, "There seems to be quite a lot of Dissatisfaction against the Police Department here, but all that we talked to seemed anxious to do anything they can to prevent any trouble." 30 Blackwell's superior, H. M. Wilkins, stated the following day that increasing numbers of dockworkers came in voluntarily and that the company was having no trouble procuring inland labor.
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Year-end shipping totals uphold these claims and indicate that freight was moving even before Cope arrived in the city. Contrary to the concerns of Hobby and his supplicants, commerce through the port increased substantially during 1920. Figures indicate that $3.2 million and $27.8 million in imported and exported goods respectively passed over Galveston's wharves during May 1920, two months into the strike. These figures represented an increase over the previous May, when only $2.1 million and $27.5 million in merchandise visited the city.
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Taken together with the increased activity on the Mallory and Morgan docks, these numbers would seem to have satisfied the demands of Hobby and his visitors. Whether they attributed this improvement to Cope's presence or some other factor, none of these men could deny the movement of freight through the port of Galveston. Given such improved conditions and the overall peacefulness of the strikers, there is only one satisfactory explanation for Hobby's abrupt declaration of martial law on June 7. When Brig. Gen. Jacob Galveston County. All of the soldiers were either dismounted cavalrymen or infantry assigned to provisional duty. Ominously, military officials also designated three troops of cavalry as machine gun squads and equipped each with an amazing 500,000 rounds of ammunition. 33 The National Guard left nothing to chance.
Intended to divide the strikers and bring the public's wrath upon them, the arrival of troops actually seemed to toughen the longshoremen's resolve. The strikers' solidarity was further strengthened by the shipping companies' decision to begin hiring Mexican strikebreakers in the days following Hobby's declaration. Both races stood to lose when a third group of competitors appeared on the docks. Neither black nor white showed much respect for the members of this alleged "in-between" race. To whites, Mexicans represented the further deterioration of already sagging wages and conditions. For African Americans, these Mexicans were competitors standing in the way of economic and social advancement; their economic exclusion from the docks reinforced white and black biracial solidarity. In the wake of the companies' announcement, the Union Review declared, "We are for America first, last, and all the time, and the best is not too good for Americans and we say send these people back where they belong until they are willing to uphold what we have fought many years to gain, and not allow themselves to be used as tools by some money-grabbing corporation to the detriment of American citizens." Coinciding as it did with the shipping companies' decision, martial law could easily be seen by the longshoremen as a tactic for replacing unionized American workers with nonunion foreigners.
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On the evening of Hobby's announcement, the Galveston Labor Council and the Dock and Marine Council organized a joint session. This "indignation meeting" resulted in a sharply worded resolution accusing Hobby of being misinformed of the facts in the strike. "We resent with all the manhood we possess," the resolution stated, "the humiliation and insult which we have been forced to suffer through the action taken by the governor." The joint meeting astutely charged the troops with assisting in the establishment of an open shop in Galveston. 35 The local labor press and its supporters abroad offered the same assessment of Hobby's action. that "the reputation of our city has been assassinated, the character of its citizenship besmirched, and the fair name of Galveston prostituted before the world by the actions of the smallest governor of the largest state in the nation." The Houston Labor Council went so far as to call for Hobby's impeachment once an independent investigation could confirm that he abused the power of his office by aiding business over labor. Not surprisingly, these denunciations were largely ignored by those at whom they were directed. 36 Wolters and his commander in chief were, however, forced to pay at least token attention to the protests of the longshoremen's supporters in the municipal government, a fact that would have repercussions in the months ahead. Shortly after receiving word of the martial law declaration, Galveston city officials telegraphically denounced Hobby's actions as "the biggest outrage ever to be perpetrated on a peaceful community." 37 On the commission's instructions, City Atty. Anderson began injunction proceedings against the National Guard to prevent it from bivouacking in Menard Park. Located within sight of beachfront attractions and the most popular bathing areas, the commission was concerned that a military camp in the park would adversely affect the busy summer tourist season. Hoping to appease his less-than-cordial hosts, Wolters voluntarily removed the camp to a vacant property further down the seawall, donated for his use by several unacknowledged private parties. One commentator joked that the beautiful beachfront location of the new Camp Hutchings, as it was called, "will to an extent compensate [the guardsmen] for the enforced military duty that they are under."
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Although the state legislature ultimately sided with Hobby and appropriated the $100,000 needed for this action, their support was not unanimous, as a handful of representatives took the opportunity to denounce the governor and his business allies for their actions on the floor of the House. "I resent the subsidizing of state troops of this state [sic] Many individuals uninvolved with the labor movement joined these legislative outcasts to voice their disapproval of both the martial law declaration and its open-shop motives. G. V. Sanders, editor of the Houston Press, opined, "Governor Hobby has been led into a number of bonehead plays during his administration, but his declaration of martial law is by far the worst of all." 40 In Galveston, an anonymous "large businessman" stated that 90 percent of the city's employers were satisfied with their workers and opposed the open shop. They had no desire to stir up labor trouble. Even some of the national guardsmen appeared to be dissatisfied with Hobby's decision. In Houston, officials issued arrest warrants for forty-nine soldiers who refused to report for duty in Galveston. When asked why, many of the men stated they had signed up to fight overseas, not against strikers in their own state. 41 Hobby and the state's business interests were apparently unimpressed by these protests. Not only did the governor refuse to lift his orders, but on June 42 Strengthened by this support, the shipping companies of Galveston gained the upper hand in their battle against the striking longshoremen.
Wolters's first action in Galveston involved securing the city and its waterfront. After a quick survey, the troops established several outposts, two of which commanded a direct view of all activity on the Morgan and Mallory docks. Three officers, fifty enlisted men, and two machine guns garrisoned each outpost, maintaining communications with Camp Hutchings by telephone. Military police under the command of the new Provost Marshal, Col. Billie Mayfield, began patrolling day and night. An intelligence department consisting of several plain clothed officers supplemented this police force. Wolters also ordered the construction of a bullpen surrounded by double barbed wire in which to keep anyone arrested by the Guard. 43 General Order no. 1, declared by Wolters immediately after his arrival, insured that this bullpen would soon contain prisoners. Among its several provisions, the order forbade all interference with persons in pursuit of work, loitering by crowds of more than two people, and public assemblies. Wolters also declared that "Any person found on the streets who appears to be habitually idle and without visible means of support will be placed under arrest." Although General Order no. 1 applied to the entire city, Wolters clearly had the strikers in mind when he issued it. Denying them the right to assemble, converse with strikebreakers, or even remain unemployed, Wolters severely circumscribed the longshoremen in their campaign against the shipping companies. His order attempted to make the strike illegal within the military district of Galveston. [1920] [1921] interviewed strikebreakers, company officials, and military authorities. Apparently refused an audience with Soape, the striking longshoremen were conspicuously absent from these meetings. The pro-business interviewees he did meet provided the secretary with predictable assessments of the situation, charging that conditions did not warrant the removal of soldiers. Soape responded to this evidence by declaring the indefinite continuation of martial law. 45 Soape's visit coincided with an even more important event. On the morning of June 15, assistant judge advocate Maj. C. H. Machem began hearing testimony from dozens of witnesses, mostly strikebreakers and company representatives, repeating reports of violence and intimidation against nonunion workers. These hearings did not bode well for the longshoremen or their supporters. Machem's final report noted at least thirty-five instances of intimidation directed at strikebreakers, shipping officials, and open-shop advocates ranging from verbal threats to physical assaults and property damage. The most damaging of these incidents were those that appeared to pit interracial groups of strikers against whites. According to one account, "a crowd of men-black and white-beat up a young white man. He was knocked to the ground by two negroes while fifteen or twenty of the crowd stood by and saw it done. Asked by a citizen what the trouble was, one of them replied, 'Just beating up one of the scabs coming from the Mallory Line.'" By publishing these findings, the National Guard attempted to use postwar racial anxiety to its advantage in ending the strike. Machem's commission also hurled charges at the police, accusing them of neglecting their duty and taking the longshoremen's side in the conflict. Together with Soape's visit, the investigative commission conferred legitimacy on Hobby's actions and Wolters' continued presence in Galveston. 46 In spite of this ex post facto propaganda effort-or perhaps because of it-the National Guard soon became quite unpopular throughout the city. Wolters's draconian orders did not serve to improve public relations. Besides interrupting regular meetings of labor organizations, the commanding general also refused to allow a mass protest meeting called by the city commissioners. Similarly, Wolters paid little attention when City Attorney Anderson declared that General Order no. 1 violated the guarantee of peaceful assembly, leading the Union Review to declare "Why Have a Constitution?" 47 Local merchants and the police force railed against the Guard's presence as well. Responding to reports that shopkeepers along the waterfront and in Galveston's downtown business district refused to deal with the hundreds of strikebreakers residing on the island, Wolters issued General Order no. 6 on June 14. Besides making it unlawful for individuals to refuse service to nonunion workers, the order also declared that "Any person who by words spoken or written, or by any act, token or sign, attempts to intimidate, or place in fear or terror of any bodily harm, or injury to the business of, any person in the territory affected by martial law . . . will be arrested by the military authorities." 48 The first person arrested under General Order no. 6 was police officer William Mihovil, who stood accused of telling a group of strikebreakers that they would be dealt with after the troops left. The guardsmen turned the patrolman over to civil authorities, who revoked his commission. Wolters's victory proved brief, however; one week later the same officials acquitted Mihovil and reinstated him onto the force. 49 The National Guard received even more opposition from local Galvestonians when it attempted to control the tourist-filled beaches. On June 15, a group of businessmen and ministers approached Police Chief Sedgewick and Police Commissioner Norman to request the closure of beachfront concessions, citing their use for gambling purposes. Both officials denied this appeal. Although there is no direct evidence, it appears that the rejected petitioners then approached and enlisted the support of Wolters to their cause. On June 18, the commanding general shut down all concessions and midway games along the beachfront. Reaction to these high-handed tactics came swiftly. W. L. Roe, secretary of the Galveston Beach Association, indignantly expressed, "Since the troops have been here the city's business has been cut down to one fifth of normal. People are afraid to come here with these men butting into everything we do. . . . Galveston is being used as a political football by a crowd of politicians who are attempting to put the city administrators in bad." The following day, Wolters capitulated and reopened the concessions, but not before issuing new orders closing all bars, brothels, and gambling houses. 50 
The Galveston Longshoremen's Strike of 1920-1921
Roe's concluding statement was indicative of the attitude many middle-class Galvestonians and small business owners had toward the powerful Galveston Wharf Company and the aristocrats that controlled it. These protesting citizens believed that local elites had enlisted Wolters and the National Guard to reestablish themselves as the city's undisputed rulers. Although the Commercial Association had traditionally supported the aristocratic Citizen's Party, events such as the strike and martial law tended to undermine its members' economic interests and led them into short-lived understandings with the working class. 51 The general's new moral crusade indicated that these suspicions had some basis in reality. By labeling Galveston a "wide open city," Wolters created a powerful piece of propaganda against his opponents on the city commission. In a July 4 announcement dismissing 525 officers and enlisted men needed at home for the upcoming harvest season, Wolters declared, "It is necessary to keep [the remaining five hundred troops] here because the city officials are backing up the strikers. . . . If we leave every nonunion man here will either be run out of town or killed." Wolters went on to claim that the administration owed its election to the city's African American voters, who he called "the worst and most insolent in Texas." 52 As this last statement shows, Wolters was not above race-baiting the longshoremen. On June 29, the general made a stunning announcement. Intelligence indicated that Galveston's black residents had recently begun gathering weapons and ammunition in large quantities. In light of this discovery, Wolters ordered the removal of all ammunition from the city's pawnshops. Galveston's African American population responded indignantly, denouncing the general for his attempt to "stir up race trouble" and vehemently denying all accusations. Although local citizens could not have known it at the time, the findings of federal investigators, themselves on the lookout for signs of African American radicalism in the postwar South, indicate that Wolters probably exaggerated these claims. Their reports show that many blacks in Houston attempted to buy ammunition, but make no mention of similar purchases in Galveston. While it is impossible to tell whether Wolters sincerely believed the reports he heard, there can be no denying that his decision to make them public was calculated to drive a series of wedges between the biracial longshoremen and their supporters in the community. 53 The seeds of these propaganda campaigns against the city commission and black Galvestonians soon bore bitter fruit, confirming the suspicions of many that, in addition to establishing an open shop, Wolters also hoped to displace the labor-backed municipal government. One scholar has gone so far as to argue that "the troops were only surrogates for Galveston's aristocracy in a conflict that had been in progress since 1840, but had intensified with the election of the City Party [in 1919]."
54 Although this conclusion is somewhat overwrought, there is little doubt that the city commission stood in the way of the shipping companies' success in the strike. Hobby recognized this and on July 15, he upped the ante by suspending all civil authority in Galveston. Making specific reference to Mayor Sappington, all four commissioners, City Attorney Anderson, the judge of the city court Henry Odell, and the entire police force, the governor's order "suspended and restrained [all officials] from performing or discharging any duty appertaining to their respective offices, with respect to enforcing the penal laws of the State of Texas and the City of Galveston, during the pendency of martial law."
55 "The laws of this state are not being faithfully executed," proclaimed Wolters, "nor can they be . . . so long as the above named city officials are permitted to remain in their respective offices and use the power and influence of their official position in aiding and encouraging the lawless element of the city." On Wolters' orders, Colonel Mayfield and the Provost Guard took control of police headquarters and all police functions for the city. Tellingly, the shipping companies' private guards retained their positions as "special marine policemen" under military jurisdiction. Violators of state laws would receive trial in a competent civil court, and Capt. O'Brien Stevens, Provost Judge for the military, would try violations of all local ordinances.
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Galveston's official response to this new insult was predictably indignant. In a statement released the same day and signed by everyone but the mayor, the commissioners charged that their displacement and the declaration of martial law were political moves "for the avowed purpose of establishing the 'open shop,' destroying union labor and taking over the city government." These men also hurled countercharges of repression and autocratic treatment at the guardsmen. "Any further encroachment upon the right of the people of this city to govern themselves," warned the commissioners, "will be resisted by application to the federal courts, where we may reasonably expect the constitutional guarantees to be respected and enforced." weeks later, City Attorney Anderson followed through on this threat, filing a suit to enjoin Hobby and Wolters from any further maintenance of martial law. Robert G. Street, presiding judge of the 56th District Court, rejected the injunction application, upholding the constitutionality of martial law and declaring the governor to have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. 58 The suspension of civil authority prompted Hobby's first and only visit to Galveston on July 21. Accompanied by Soape, Adjutant General Cope, and Atty. Gen. C. M. Cureton, the governor met behind closed doors with a small group of local judges and lawyers to discuss a plan for ending the occupation. The Daily News speculated that the proposal involved setting up the local judiciary as a central committee, which would then direct the efforts of Texas Rangers and a new citizen's police force in protecting strikebreakers, but could not confirm these reports. Whatever the topic of discussion, Hobby apparently left the meeting unimpressed. When asked what it would take to have the troops removed, he responded "I must have absolute assurance-no, to put it stronger than that, an absolute demonstration that Galveston can care for the situation here so as to insure the uninterrupted movement of freight through this port and the protection of all workers connected with shipping." 59 Wolters's assumption of civil authority quickly changed what had been an otherwise peaceful atmosphere. Throughout the first month and a half of martial law, the state troops stationed in the city remained on good behavior. The inactivity and silence of the striking longshoremen mirrored this. Unable to picket, most of the men found temporary jobs on deep-sea piers, and strikebreaking activity went on at the Morgan and Mallory docks with little interruption. Following the July 15 declaration, however, the actions of the National Guard began to generate a great deal of negative publicity. Whether accidental or intentional, these events adversely affected the way most people viewed the occupation. The first such incident occurred on July 30 when Pvt. J. C. Tyer shot and killed Capt. Herbert A. Robertson for refusing to stop at an outpost. Justice of the Peace E. B. Holman issued a civil warrant charging Tyer with murder, but Wolters refused to turn him over. After a court martial had acquitted him of all charges, Tyer was removed from Galveston County to face civil charges. 60 The subsequent fate of Private Tyer was less important than the effect that his actions had on public opinion. Robertson's shooting was the most recent in a string of accidental deaths known or suspected to have been associated with the National Guard. Days before, Pvt. Abe Ginsburg shot himself in the face, unintentionally it appeared, while showing his revolver to his visiting sister-in-law. Even more damaging was the death of Mrs. W. Auderer, mysteriously shot at her home in mid-July. During her autopsy, medical examiners extracted a steel-jacketed bullet suspiciously similar to the ones used in the guardsmen's high-powered rifles. The spilling of blood added another dimension to what many already viewed as a shameful crime perpetrated against Galveston. Numerous commentators questioned the competency of the state troops and their ability to maintain law and order on the island. Instead of seasoned police officers, "green, untrained, irresponsible youths of the Texas National Guard, bearing loaded army rifles and pistols, have been charged with the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the law," claimed the Houston Press. In light of these three incidents, more and more people began to doubt the ultimate usefulness of martial law in Galveston.
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The military presence incurred further public disfavor through the high-handed actions of its soldiers and officers throughout the month of August. Eyewitnesses began reporting that contrary to Wolters's orders, many of the guardsmen were partaking in rather than ridding the city of vice.
62 Shortly after this, Wolters received a visit from a representative of Fox Film News wanting to use the guardsmen to shoot a picture about the Galveston strike. The general obliged and provided his soldiers as actors while cameras caught the action in a staged "battle" between strikers and guardsmen at Union Station. Such transparent propaganda did not amuse city officials. After condemning the film for its misrepresentation of their city, the commissioners quickly received word of its cancellation from the studio. Even the Galveston Commercial Association and the Young Men's Progressive League, both of whom favored the presence of state troops, joined the commissioners in denouncing the picture. 63 Besides upsetting prominent Galvestonians, including some of his most adamant supporters, Wolters's decision to allow the film again indicated his lack of neutrality in the strike.
The National Guard's most spectacular and damaging indiscretions involved the Houston Press and its editor G. V. Sanders. Since the declaration of martial law, almost every issue of this progressive newspaper carried news of the Galveston strike. Although the paper reported many exaggerated and obviously propagandistic stories, Sanders's criticisms of Wolters and Hobby were often quite perceptive. He rarely missed an opportunity to skewer either of them for their actions. In one particularly incendiary front-page article, the paper compared Wolters to General Ludendorff, the German army's supreme commander in World War I. 64 Remarks such as these aroused anger among military officials and made the Houston Press unwelcome in the martial law zone. Vendors were arrested for selling the paper, and on at least one occasion, a member of the National Guard attacked one of the paper's correspondents. 65 The most serious incident took place on the night of August 30, when three men attempted to abduct Sanders as he left the Houston Country Club. With the aid of bystanders, many of them prominent Houston city officials and businessmen, the editor escaped. Upon interrogation, the would-be abductors revealed their identities: all three held commissions as lieutenants in the National Guard stationed at Galveston. Before returning to their proper jurisdiction on the island, Lt. J. A. Dempsey presented an order from Colonel Mayfield that read, "You are ordered to arrest Sanders, editor of the Houston Press, for writing and circulating highly incendiary literature calculated to precipitate serious trouble in the zone of military law, both among civilians and soldiers." 66 This bungled seizure was almost universally condemned. Attempting to shield himself from criticism, Wolters declared that although he had issued instructions to arrest Sanders, the guardsmen acted on their own in taking the matter outside Galveston. Houston City Atty. Kenneth Krahl turned his anger toward Hobby, saying "I have been convinced for some time Texas had a fool for governor. If he doesn't take proper action to clean out the whole bunch guilty of [this] outrage, I will be convinced that we have a knave for governor." The mayor of Houston, A. E. Amerman, called the affair "a very foolish stunt" and wired his objection to Austin. Many probusiness newspapers joined in denouncing the high-handed action. "Even if the military authorities had attempted to execute their warrant in the military zone of Galveston," the Houston Post editorialized, "it would have been an unwarranted abuse of military authority . . . there is or ought to be no military despotism in this State."
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Perhaps on the orders of his commanding officer, Colonel Mayfield attempted to control this damage and Sanders's allegations of false imprisonment by announcing on September 1 that he accepted full responsibility for the failed arrest. Wolters immediately relieved Mayfield of his duty as Provost Marshall. A subsequent court martial cleared the three lieutenants of all charges, but Mayfield, proclaiming his guilt, stood by his belief that the arrest lay within his jurisdiction since Sanders's articles aroused tension among both soldiers and citizenry. After three days of testimony from witnesses, including Sanders, the court martial reached a verdict. Before making their decision public, however, the officers sent sealed copies to Austin for Hobby to approve. The Houston Press cried foul, labeling the trial a farce. Two weeks later, Hobby proved these suspicions correct, announcing the colonel's acquittal and recommission in the Guard.
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Although the evidence is scant, it seems that the bad press garnered by Mayfield's actions and the National Guard's indiscretions gave Hobby reasons to consider withdrawing the troops. A cryptic statement carried in the Dallas Dispatch and reprinted by the Houston Press quoted the governor as saying that "a crisis is expected in Galveston soon [and] there may be no further need of troops there." Hobby also had to consider the mounting costs of the expedition. Since June, the state had spent $150,000 on the troops. This $50,000 shortfall had forced the notoriously stingy legislature to obtain deficiency warrants from private banks. On the afternoon of September 18, as abruptly as he had declared it three and a half months before, Hobby and city officials made public the terms of an agreement to end martial law.
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Since the beginning of September, a committee consisting of religious leaders, local businessmen, labor representatives, and the mayor and commissioners had been in meetings to formulate a plan for removing troops. On September 16, Hobby received a copy of their suggestions signed by committee president Jacob Singer and Mayor Sappington. The citizen's committee requested that the governor send an experienced Ranger officer to command the police department and exercise authority over all peace officers in the city. To assuage anxieties about police neglect, the commissioners pledged "to suspend temporarily and remove from office permanently . . . any officer of the city of Galveston who attempts in any way to impede, obstruct, or interfere with the protection of workers and the enforcement of the law." In addition, the citizen's committee was to continue in an advisory capacity with the purpose of bringing about "a more amicable understanding between employers and employees in the city." 70 Embarrassed perhaps by the National Guard's recent actions, Hobby announced his satisfaction with the plan and ordered Ranger Capt. Joe Brooks to Galveston, where he would assume police control once martial law ended on October 1. All troops would leave the island between October 5 and 10. Hobby carefully qualified both announcements, however, stating that he would not hesitate to reimplement martial law if the situation once again deteriorated. Keeping these words in mind, the displaced mayor and city commissioners abruptly regained their executive authority at midnight on October 1. That same night, Captain Brooks and thirty-five Texas Rangers replaced General Wolters and the National Guardsmen as Galveston's police authority. In a final indication of the motives behind martial law, local businessmen hosted a banquet for the remaining soldiers at the luxurious Hotel Galvez. These "representative citizens" presented Wolters with a silver loving cup inscribed with the words "An Unpleasant Duty Well Performed." Each of the soldiers also received medals thanking them for their service. On the morning of October 8, the remaining five hundred troops left the island without further ceremony, officially ending Galveston's four-month-long encounter with military occupation. Although they were no longer physically present, the memory of the National Guard lingered in the shipping companies' negotiations with the strikers.
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On August 15, the members of Locals 385 and 807 had contacted their respective shipping agents and offered to return to work immediately if the companies discharged all strikebreakers. The response they received demonstrated the Morgan and Mallory lines' new commitment to the open shop as well as the power that the presence of the troops afforded them. In order to gain eligibility for rehire, the members of the striking unions first had to agree to three conditions: 1) the employment of clerks and foremen at company, rather than union, discretion; 2) the prohibition of all union delegates from the docks; and 3) nondiscrimination in hiring. 72 This final condition was the most onerous. It meant that no man-union or nonunion, black or white-would receive preference on Galveston's coastwise docks. Not only would this overturn the ILA's ability to control hiring in the port, but it would also destroy the uneasy biracialism that existed between black and white longshoremen by bringing them into direct competition for jobs. The men immediately rejected these conditions. One union official declared, "I, for one, will never open my mouth in favor of agreeing to such un-American terms as those submitted by the steamship companies, which would displace American citizens in favor of alien peons who are absolutely without any desire for a decent standard of living, and who pass their lives huddled together under their filthy ponchos when they are not at work." Neither company, however, paid attention to these protests. On August 25, Mallory officials issued an ultimatum to the strikers. The conditions for reemployment would remain on the 73 Although biracial solidarity had managed to withstand the slings and arrows of its opponents for over five months, in Texas's racially charged atmosphere, this alliance could only endure so much pressure before it eventually broke.
The feared split finally occurred on December 13, 1920. Following two months of negotiation, representatives of Local 807 signed an agreement allowing their members to resume work on the Mallory line. The Galveston citizen's committee, which had acquired significant standing in September after devising a plan for the removal of troops, stood at the heart of this resolution. Most of the terms in the new agreement mirrored those offered by the shipping companies in August. Pending their acceptance of nondiscrimination in hiring, the prohibition of union delegates, and the employment of foremen and clerks at company discretion, the strikers could return to work at a rate of $0.67 an hour regular time and $1.00 overtime. The settlement also established new grievance procedures, directing all future disagreements to the attention of the citizen's committee for arbitration. Two days later, more than one hundred of the striking longshoremen returned to their jobs at the Mallory docks for the first time since March. Another large group of men followed this example the next day, prompting Mallory shipping agent F. T. Rennie to declare that "Conditions . . . are practically restored to normal." The Galveston Longshoremen's Strike of [1920] [1921] only whites, a settlement would have been easily forthcoming. There seemed to be little hope that Local 385 could bring about a successful conclusion of the strike alone. Wilkins, however, entertained different ideas. Instead of offering to discharge its force of black and Mexican strikebreakers, the Morgan line stood firm on its policy of nondiscrimination. Formerly the exclusive domain of white longshoremen, the Southern Pacific docks suddenly became a potential arena for racial mixing.
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This challenge sounded the death knell of biracial waterfront unionism in Galveston. Willing to accept all of the company's other terms for reemployment, the members of Local 385 adamantly refused to return to work until they received a guarantee that blacks and whites would not be integrated. Wilkins offered a similarly stubborn response. "It was to our great regret that the white men left us as they did," he declared, "but the present situation is one brought on by themselves." He claimed that at the Southern Pacific docks in New Orleans and the shops in Houston, black and white worked together without trouble. The Morgan line did not intend to mix the races, but reserved the right to do so if conditions made it necessary. "Our present dockworkers, numbering several hundred men, less than ten percent of whom are white, voluntarily came to the rescue of the Morgan line and its patrons when the company was in distress," Wilkins continued. Negotiating a contract that excluded either race from employment would not only be a violation of laws upholding the free pursuit of one's business, but also an insult to the company's recent saviors.
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The Morgan line's racial policies received strong denunciations from Local 385 and the citizen's arbitration committee. Challenging Wilkins's claim, O. A. Anderson declared that Texas's Jim Crow laws prohibited whites from working side by side with blacks. "The laboring men have agreed to every proposition asked by the Morgan line," he announced, "but are not going to shoulder a truck with the negroes." Other white union men argued that 80 percent of Galveston's dockworkers would be black if the Morgan line opened its docks to all races. Such an imbalance threatened to overturn the port's racial hierarchy. At a conference held January 22, a representative of Local 385 declared that "we pleaded with Mr. Wilkins, not as union men, but as white men" to reconsider the company's position. The citizen's committee also expressed its disapproval of the Southern Pacific's actions, saying that it would be wrong for the people of Texas and Galveston to further protect the company if it insisted on mixing the races, "a fundamentally wrong and unsound practice." "There can be no condition of harmony existing here by the mixing of the races," the committee declared. 77 Wilkins's intransigence also drew the public's wrath. The Daily News editorialized that the Morgan line should recognize the impracticality of race-mixing and end the strike by employing one group or the other exclusively. Because whites formerly worked the docks, "The News ventures to offer the hope that white men will be reemployed." County Judge E. B. Holman argued that "the mixing of blacks and whites on the dock is bound to lead to trouble later on." Blacks belonged in the cotton field, not "the white man's town" of Galveston. Chief of Police Sedgewick agreed with Holman, declaring ominously that "to have negroes in a subordinate position will probably work to advantage, but to mix the whites in positions similar to those held by negroes and to work the gangs intermixed is a sure sign of racial trouble that will never be stamped out in the South." The concern for this situation reached all the way to Austin, where the state's newly inaugurated governor Pat Neff decided not to withdraw Capt. Joe Brooks and his force of Texas Rangers until the Morgan line completely settled the strike and, ostensibly, the racial questions it had raised. 78 Despite the public opposition that this blatant disregard for contemporary racial standards caused, the Morgan line did not fear reprisal. Even after the members of Local 385 appealed to Governor Neff for assistance, the company stood steadfast behind Wilkins and its open-shop policy of nondiscrimination. This unprecedented turn of events dumbfounded the white longshoremen. None of them ever seriously expected that the waterfront's racial order would be completely overturned. The only leverage these men enjoyed-their whiteness-meant little to company officials eager to end the strike. By allowing African Americans to dominate the coastwise workforce, the Morgan and Mallory lines successfully played the black and white longshore locals off one another and divided the strike along racial lines. Without this solidarity, Galveston's longshoremen had no hope of success against their powerful opponents. Local 385 realized this at the end of January 1921 and grudgingly accepted the Morgan line's conditions for reemployment. On the morning of February 1, a small number of white coastwise longshoremen returned to their jobs
